2 edition of One share/one vote and the market for corporate control found in the catalog.
by Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, Mass
Written in English
|Statement||Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart|
|Series||Working paper / Dept. of Economics -- no. 440, Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) -- no. 440.|
|Contributions||Hart, Oliver D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||57 p. ;|
|Number of Pages||57|
F. Modigliani (), ‘Debt, Dividend Policy, Taxes, Inflation and Market Valuation’ S.A. Ross (), ‘Debt and Taxes and Uncertainty’ Part V Voting and Control S.J. Grossman and O.D. Hart (), ‘One Share–One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control’ M. Harris and A. Raviv (), ‘The Design of Securities’. However, one share-one vote does not always maximize the reward to securityholders in a corporate control contest. Sufficient conditions are given for one share-one vote to be optimal : Asher Wolinsky. “Is One-Share-One-Vote Optimal?” Manuscript. London: London School Econ., Google Scholar. “One Share-One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control.” Shleifer A., Vishny R.W. () Law and Finance. In: Schwalbach J. (eds) Corporate Governance. Publications of the Society for Economics and Management at Humboldt-University Cited by: Market-Based Corporate Governance System: A system relying on the investors of a firm to exert control over how the corporation is to be managed. A market-based corporate governance system defines.
“ One Share-One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control.” Journal of Financial Economics, 20 (), – Hausman, J. “ Specification Tests in Econometrics.”Cited by: Empirical Evidence on Corporate Governance in Europe. The Effect on Stock Returns, Firm Value and Performance Corporate Control & Organization eJournal. Subscribe to this fee journal for more curated articles on this topic One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate by: As shown by Grossman and Hart (), such optimal institutional arrangements include one-share-one-vote provisions. This allows the optimal functioning of the takeover market. If, later on, the management extracts too many private benefits (e.g., through excessive empire building or leisure), the share price drops, and the company becomes a Author: Markus Berndt. Download PDF: Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s): (external link)Author: Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart.
The other major criticism is that the market for corporate control causes managers and boards of public companies to focus on short-term share price performance rather than on long-term projects. This criticism is illogical. Share prices reflect the present value of future returns to shareholders and are, therefore, a measure of the long run. Start studying FIN_Chap2. Learn vocabulary, terms, and more with flashcards, games, and other study tools. Search. Non-Anglo-American markets are dominated by the "one-vote-one-share" rule. B. 5) According to recent research, family-owned firms in some highly-developed economies the market for corporate control that allows for. corporate control divert energy from more productive endeavors.2 In this section, we find that such criticisms are ill founded, and thus conclude that battles for corporate control serve a beneficial function for the economy. The market for corporate control is the market for the right to control the management of corporate resources. 7Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart, ‘One Share-One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control’ () 20 Journal of Financial Economics Milton Harris and Artur Raviv, ‘Corporate Governance: Voting Rights and Majority Rules’ () 20 Journal of Financial Economics
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One share-one vote and the market for corporate control (Discussion paper) Unknown Binding – January 1, by Sanford J Grossman (Author) See all formats and editions Hide other formats and editions. The Amazon Book Review Author interviews, book reviews, editors' picks, and more.
Author: Sanford J One share/one vote and the market for corporate control book. One share-one vote maximizes the importance of benefits to securityholders relative to benefits to the controlling party and hence encourages the selection of an efficient management team.
However, one share-one vote does not always maximize the regard to securityholders in a corporate control by: Share. Export. Advanced. COVID campus closures: see options for Remote Access to subscribed content. Journal of Financial Economics. Vol January–MarchPages One share-one vote and the market for corporate control.
Author links open overlay panel Sanford J. Grossman Oliver D. Hart. Show more. https: Cited by: Under certain assumptions, one share/one vote best achieves this One share/one vote and the market for corporate control book. We distinguish between two classes of benefits from control: private benefits and security benefits.
The private benefits of control refer to benefits the current management or the acquirer obtain for themselves, but which the target security holders do not by: votesastheirclaimtoincome("oneshare/onevote") Although the literature has emphasized thatthereare agencyproblems created bythe delegation of control to management, it hasnot established.
One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control Sanford J. Grossman, Oliver D. Hart. NBER Working Paper No. Issued in August NBER Program(s):Monetary Economics A corporation's securities provide the holder with particular claims on the firm's income stream and particular voting by: One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control Reprinted in The Theory of Corporate Finance, M.
Brennan (ed.), Brookfield VT: Edward Elgar Publishing Company, Cited by: One share/one vote and the market for corporate control. Author(s) Grossman, Sanford J.; Hart, Oliver D. One share/one vote and the market for corporate control. Author(s) Grossman, Sanford J.; Hart, Oliver D. (Mb) Other by: “One-share, one-vote,” a bedrock principle of Anglo-Saxon corporate governance, is back in the spotlight.
Except this time the aim is to diminish its application rather than to extend its. Rather, the rationale for mandating one share - one vote must be to disempower controlling minority shareholders in order to promote value-increasing takeovers. As this policy tends to empower managers vis-à-vis shareholders, it is an open question whether it would improve the quality of corporate governance, notably in systems built around.
Under certain assumptions, one share/one vote best achieves this goal. We distinguish between two classes of benefits from control: private benefits and security benefits. The private benefits of control refer to benefits the current management or the acquirer obtain for themselves, but which the target security holders do not obtain.
ONE SHARE, ONE VOTE one vote" provides a powerful slogan for shareholder governance in our corporate law.5 The phrase is appealing because it provides a system of governance based on a reductive but equitable distribution: each unit shall have the same power of control over the organization.
"One share. One Share-One Vote: disciplining ef fect of the market for corporate control. However, share-one vote mitigate the free-rider p roblem in dispersedly held ﬁrms. References: p.
One share/one vote and the market for corporate control Item PreviewPages: FINANCE – Financial Institutions Itay Goldstein Spring Takeovers and Corporate Control Book Chapters: Tirole, Chapter S., and O.
Hart,“One share-one vote and the market for corporate control,” Journal of Financial Econom Harris, M., and A. Raviv,“Corporate governance: voting rights and File Size: 23KB.
One share-one vote and the market for corporate control. Journal of Financial Economics, –[Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar] refer to such issues as the private benefits of control.
Importantly, however, outside shareholders Cited by: One share-one vote and the market for corporate control. Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart. Journal of Financial Economics,vol. 20, issueDate: References: Add references at CitEc Citations: View citations in EconPapers () Track citations by Cited by: While it ensures an efficient outcome in bidding contests, dual-class shares mitigate the free-rider problem, thereby promoting takeovers.
In the presence of a controlling shareholder, one share - one vote promotes value-increasing control transfers and deters value-decreasing control transfers more effectively than any other vote by: One-share-one-vote Hostile stakes and block sales Conclusion and unresolved issues Large investors Ownership dispersion and voting control Ownership, voting control and corporate performance Share blocks and stock market liquidity Banks Minority.
The market for corporate control mainly refers to the market for acquisitions and mergers the market for corporate control cannot resolve principal-agent problems and that, on the The Method had 61 provisions and, if one of the following conditions applied to the purchaser, it constituted actual control rights: File Size: KB.
One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control ABSTRACT A pdf securities provide the holder with particular claims on the firm's income stream and particular voting rights.
These securities can be designed in various ways: one share of a particular class may have a claim to. 1 Introduction.
We survey the empirical literature on the causes and consequences download pdf disproportional ownership. By disproportional ownership we mean mechanisms that allow some shareholders to control a proportion of votes that is larger than their proportion of rights to the firm's cash flows, i.e.
deviations from the “one share-one vote” by: one ebook vote: the empirical evidence 55 such as share classes with differential voting rights, voting rules and caps, vot- ing agreements, pyramidal control structures, cross .